Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Osgoode Digital Commons
Articles & Book Chapters

Faculty Scholarship

4-2013

Technological Neutrality: (Pre)Serving the Purposes of Copyright
Law
Carys J. Craig
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, ccraig@osgoode.yorku.ca

Source Publication:
The Copyright Pentalogy: How the Supreme Court of Canada Shook the Foundations of
Canadian Copyright Law, Edited by Michael Geist. Ottawa, ON: University of Ottawa Press, 2014.

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works

Repository Citation
Craig, Carys J., "Technological Neutrality: (Pre)Serving the Purposes of Copyright Law" (2013). Articles &
Book Chapters. 1599.
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works/1599

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of
Osgoode Digital Commons.

9
Technological Neutrality:
(Pre)Serving the Purposes of
Copyright Law
carys j . craig

1. Introduction

In the realm of law, neutrality is widely hailed as a fundamental
principle of fairness, justice and equity; it is also, however, widely
criticized as a myth that too often obscures the inevitable reality of
perspective, interest or agenda. It should come as little surprise, then,
that the principle of technological neutrality, recently employed by
the Supreme Court of Canada when applying copyright law to online
activities, seems similarly fundamental in the copyright realm—but
also largely mythical and potentially obfuscatory. In what is now
dubbed the Supreme Court’s “copyright pentalogy”—five copyright
judgments released concurrently by the Court in July 20121—the
unprecedented importance accorded by the Court to the principle
of technological neutrality is clear; what remains unclear is precisely
what “technological neutrality” means, why it matters, and whether
or how it can (or should) ever be attained.
This chapter aims to critically assess the significance of the principle and its potential to guide the future development of copyright
law and policy in Canada. In Part 2, I set out the various shades of
meaning that can be attached to technological neutrality, first as a
271
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principle of sound regulation, and then as a principle of statutory
interpretation by the courts. I review, in Part 3, the reasons delivered
by the Justices in three of the five cases to examine the various and
divergent ways in which the principle of technological neutrality was
defined and rationalized by members of the Court. I proceed to explore
the application of the principle and its role in resolving the legal issues
before the Court, drawing connections between conceptualizations of
the principle and its interpretive impact, and focusing on its capacity
to support the extension and/or circumscription of owners’ and users’
rights. In Part 4, I consider whether the role accorded to technological
neutrality as a guiding principle is justifiable or appropriate in the
context of Canadian copyright policy. Arguing that its justification is
found in, and flows from, the concept of balance at the heart of the
copyright system, I proceed to offer some thoughts on its potential
significance in the future of Canadian copyright law and in light of
the recent amendments to the Copyright Act.2 Part 5 concludes that
the new emphasis placed by the Court on technological neutrality
as a guiding principle is an important and positive development for
Canada’s copyright system. The caveat, however, is that the principle
cannot perform this role effectively if conceived (or rhetorically
invoked) as a limited principle of formal non-discrimination that
merely justifies the extension of copyright’s reach. Rather, I argue, it
must be conceived in a functional sense, shaping copyright norms to
produce a substantively equivalent effect across technologies, with a
view to preserving the copyright balance in the digital realm.
2. Understanding Technological Neutrality and Its Shades
of Meaning

2.1 Technological Neutrality as a Regulatory Starting Point
Technological neutrality is an inherently appealing concept for
policy makers in the digital age. At its core, the concept implies that
regulations can and should be developed in such a way that they are
independent of any particular technology, neither favouring nor
discriminating against specific technologies as they emerge and evolve.
From a principled perspective, neutrality and non-discrimination in
the law are almost always laudable goals; from a practical perspective,
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technologically neutral regulation holds the promise of sustainable
laws in a time of rapid technological change. No doubt owing to this
intrinsic appeal, the principle of technological neutrality is regularly
invoked as a regulatory starting point in policy documents from
around the globe,3 but typically with little explanation or justification.
This led one commentator to align technological neutrality with
“motherhood and apple pie”4—the general wisdom being that it is an
unquestionably good thing. Professor Reed rightly cautions that “this
consensus among legislators seems to have developed in an almost
complete absence of any clear understanding [of] what the term
‘technology neutrality’ might actually mean.”5 In fact, technological
neutrality has many shades of meaning, and, of course, different
meanings can produce differing applications with more or less
desirable results. Before we embark on understanding the significance
of the principle as invoked by the Supreme Court, it is therefore worth
exploring the various ways in which it might be employed.
Bert-Jaap Koops has expertly deconstructed the claim (or “policy
one-liner”) that ICT regulation should be technology neutral, helping
us to discern the divergent meanings and potential uses of the
term.6 Koops explains that usages can be divided into three broad
categories: those emphasizing (A) the purpose of regulation; (B) the
consequences of regulation; and (C) legislative technique. Within
each of these categories, Koops identifies two or more approaches,
which are closely interrelated but stress different aspects of technology
neutrality.
Focusing on the substantive purpose of regulation, one
approach (A1) stresses the need to regulate functions and effects
of actions (technology uses), but not the actions or means of the
actions (the technologies) themselves. This functional approach
produces regulation that is intended to be technology neutral in its
effects (though it may be technology-specific where the effects of
technologies differ).7 A second and related purposive approach (A2)
emphasizes that what holds offline should also hold online, with the
goal of establishing functional equivalence between the online and
offline worlds (and, again, different treatment of specific technologies
may be necessary to realize equivalent results).8
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A less substantive approach to technological neutrality focuses on
avoiding potential negative consequences of regulation. One version
(B1) stresses non-discrimination between certain technologies so that
the rules do not favour some technologies over others. Related to this,
a second version (B2) starts with the position that regulation should
not hamper the development of technologies. This, too, can justify
technology-specific regulation, where uniform rules might inhibit
new technologies (for example, the decision not to extend traditional
broadcasting content regulations to the Internet).
Finally, emphasizing legislative technique, another approach
to technological neutrality derives from basic principles of lawmaking. First, it might be stressed (C1) that effective laws should be
sustainable and not constantly in flux as technologies change. The
extent to which consistency in function or effect can be achieved over
time and in the face of rapid technological change is, of course, open
to challenge. A related starting point (C2) is that formal laws should
be sustainable while other forms of regulation can more appropriately
be used to further technology-specific aims. An alternative starting
point in the same vein (C3) might stress that the law should be
transparent and readily understood by those who are subject to it.
The more technologically specific the rules, the more detailed and the
less accessible they become (as anyone who has taken even a cursory
glance at Canada’s new Copyright Modernization Act would likely
attest!).
For the purposes of what follows, the approaches identified by
Koops can be broadly classified into those concerned primarily
with a functional approach to copyright law (producing equivalent
effect across technologies); the potential discriminatory or adverse
consequences of copyright on technological development; and
the “future-proofing” of copyright law. Importantly, none of these
approaches necessarily entails neutrality in the sense of a formal
equality that would preclude differentiation between technologies by
the law; rather, different treatment can be justified as substantively
technology neutral where overlooking technical differences would
produce unequal results.
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2.2 Technological Neutrality as a Judicial Approach
If these various approaches describe the starting point for the
development of technology-neutral regulation, what should
technological neutrality mean for the judiciary and others charged
with interpreting and applying the law? While Koops’s concern
is with regulatory practice, he acknowledges that one strategy for
achieving technological neutrality is for laws to be interpreted in a
functionalist or teleological way, according more importance to their
purpose than their precise form.9 Even where the laws as written are
technologically specific, Koops suggests that technological neutrality
can be advanced through their functional interpretation. The capacity
for such teleological interpretation is enhanced, Koops notes, by the
establishment of a legal framework that outlines the main substantive
principles, rights and values that are at stake.10 Such a framework is,
by nature, technology neutral and supports a functional approach to
the application of specific rules.
In a similar vein, but focusing specifically on the role of courts in
maintaining the media neutrality of copyright law, Deborah Tussey
articulates three “rules-of-thumb” to keep courts “on a media-neutral
keel.”11 First, where statutory guidance is lacking or ambiguous, courts
should generally afford functionally equivalent technologies similar
treatment unless there is a compelling doctrinal or policy reason that
dictates otherwise. Tussey explains, “To the extent that the copyright
balance of incentives and access has been appropriately set for a
pre-existing technology, similar treatment of functional equivalents
should maintain that balance.”12 Second, where there is no clear and
pre-existing functional equivalent, courts should avoid emphasizing
the details of particular technological systems and instead interpret
copyright’s core concepts in a manner applicable across technologies.
A good example of this approach is found in the judicial treatment of
software infringement claims that invoke basic concepts of originality,
idea-expression dichotomy, merger and scènes à faire to determine
if substantial copying of code has occurred.13 Finally, courts should
give more weight to broader policy considerations such as fairness,
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incentives and innovation, as well as related empirical evidence, in
determining how the law should apply to new technologies: “the
application of text to technology should be accompanied by full and
fair review of policy concerns and consideration of likely market
impacts.”14
The concept of technological or media neutrality has in fact
made quite frequent appearances in the copyright jurisprudence of
several common law jurisdictions, but unfortunately without much
elucidation of its meaning, or explanation as to why, or the extent
to which, it matters. In the United States, media neutrality has been
described as “a fundamental principle of the Copyright Act,” and has
been endorsed by the Supreme Court as a relevant consideration in
determining the scope of copyright, particularly in the context of
collective works.15 The principle has remained closely tied to the idea
(C1) that the 1976 US legislation was intentionally “future-proofed,”
with the result that the rights it protects are generally not technology
specific.16 The uncontroversial nature of this basic and rather benign
proposition has allowed the principle to remain largely beyond
critique.17 In the United Kingdom, the legislative intention to achieve
technological neutrality has been taken into account in determining
the broad scope of the “communication to the public” right.18 The
concept has received more extensive consideration in the Australian
courts, where a declared objective of the copyright law revision
process was “to replace technology-specific rights with technology
neutral rights so that amendments to the Act are not needed each time
there is a development in technology.”19 As in the United Kingdom,
the principle has been invoked to support the inclusion of pointto-multipoint transmissions within the right of “communication to
the public.”20 In a recent case, the full Federal Court referred more
generally to “the desirability of technological neutrality—of not
limiting rights and defences to technologies known at the time when
those rights and defences were enacted.”21 The Court also explicitly
limited the significance of the principle, however, stating: “It is not for
this Court to re-draft [a] provision to secure an assumed legislative
desire for such [technological] neutrality.”22
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 . Technological Neutrality before the Supreme Court of
3
Canada

3.1 Media Neutrality in Robertson v Thomson
While the term “media neutrality” had previously surfaced in
Canada’s courts,23 it was in the 2006 case of Robertson v Thomson that
the Supreme Court first explicitly addressed its significance in the
copyright context.24 The reasons offered by the split bench in Robertson
merit attention as a harbinger of what subsequently unfolded in the
2012 decisions.
The majority in Robertson found that reproduction of the Globe
& Mail newspaper in an electronic database caused the original
compilation work to be “fragmented, submerged, overwhelmed
and lost”,25 with the result that the database was found to reproduce
the individual articles as opposed to the newspaper per se, thereby
potentially infringing the copyright of freelance authors in their
works. The dissenting Justices invoked the concept of media neutrality
to stress the functional equivalence of the electronic database with an
electronic archive, itself akin to a traditional library:
If media neutrality is to have any meaning, it must
permit the publishers to convert their daily print edition
into electronic form…. [T]his electronic edition…is a
reproduction of the print edition in electronic form.
That is precisely what media neutrality protects. … The
analysis is unchanged if a number of these hypothetical
electronic editions are collected together. This is simply
the electronic analogy to stacking print editions of a
newspaper on a shelf.26
The majority was criticized for its concern with the form rather
than the substance of the database on the grounds that this was
“inconsistent with the media neutral approach mandated by s 3 of the
Copyright Act.”27
The principle of media neutrality was, however, explicitly
acknowledged by all members of the Court. The majority judgment
recognized that “[m]edia neutrality is reflected in s 3(1) of the
Copyright Act which describes a right to produce or reproduce a work

278 | THE COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY

‘in any material form whatever,’”28 and emphasized that the Justices
were “mindful of the principle”29 in arriving at their conclusion. The
difference between the majority and minority application of media
neutrality to the legal issue at hand can be at least partly explained,
however, by the divergent characterizations of the principle and the
significance attributed to it.
The majority defined media neutrality as meaning that “the
Copyright Act should continue to apply in different media, including
more technologically advanced ones.”30 This approach is focused on
non-discrimination between different technologies (in the sense of
Koops’s meaning B2), and is thus limited where differences between
media produce legally significant differences in effect. The majority
found that the electronic database was not simply an equivalent, if
more effective, technical alternative to the traditional or even electronic
archiving of individual issues, such that “focusing exclusively on
input in the name of media neutrality takes the principle too far and
ultimately, turns it on its head.”31 Given that the principle “exists to
protect the rights of authors and others as technology evolves,” the
majority insisted that media neutrality “is not a license to override the
rights of authors.”32
The minority accorded media neutrality a somewhat different
significance. Similarly taking as a starting point the section 3(1)
right to reproduce the work “in any material form,” the minority
stressed that “[t]he concept of media neutrality is how Parliament
chose to come to grips with potential technological developments”33
(consistent with meaning C1). The minority’s emphasis on the
functional equivalence of electronic and traditional archiving
further invokes technical neutrality in the sense of regulating effects
rather than means (A1) and achieving equivalency between offline
and online activities (A2). But what comes through clearly in the
dissenting reasons—and particularly in the passages that speak to
the potential of new technologies—is the commitment to a principle
of media neutrality attentive primarily to the purpose of the law
(in the sense of meaning A, generally). Thus, the minority analysis
begins by observing that section 3(1) of the Copyright Act has been
substantially unchanged since 1921, just after “the first domestic
radio sets, and many decades before the technological revolution
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that produced, among other innovations, online databases.”34 The
reasons proceed directly to a description of the overarching purposes
of copyright, as articulated by the Court in the case of Théberge v
Galérie d’Art du Petit Champlain inc.: “promoting the public interest
in the encouragement and dissemination of artistic and intellectual
works, and justly rewarding the creator of the work.”35 Tasked with
maintaining an appropriate balance between these goals, the minority
notes the significance of the public interest in the availability of
archived newspapers.36 The link between the public purposes of
copyright and the public interest in new technologies is brought to
the fore in the following passage, which hints at how a purposive
construction of copyright law aligns with a functional conception of
technological neutrality:
The Copyright Act was designed to keep pace with
technological developments to foster intellectual, artistic
and cultural creativity. In applying the Copyright Act
to a realm that includes the Internet and the databases
at issue in this case, courts face unique challenges,
but in confronting them, the public benefits of this
digital universe should be kept prominently in view. As
Professor Michael Geist observes:
The Internet and new technologies have unleashed a
remarkable array of new creativity, empowering millions
of individuals to do more than just consume our culture,
instead enabling them to actively and meaningfully
participate in it.37
The divergence between the minority and majority rulings
in Robertson reveals the importance of the particular meaning or
emphasis given to the principle of technological neutrality, and the
bearing that this has on the results that the principle will produce.
It also suggests, however, that even following the rules of thumb for
media-neutral interpretations of the law could produce significantly
different results depending on the assumptions that are brought to
bear at any stage of the analysis.
Consider again Tussey’s first rule of thumb, that “where statutory
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guidance is lacking or ambiguous, courts should afford functionally
equivalent technologies similar treatment.”38 In any case, particularly
one involving new technologies, reasonable people may differ on the
question of whether the law is actually clear or ambiguous, and on
whether it is directly applicable as written or effectively silent given the
technical specificities at issue. Opinions might also differ on whether
an analogy to a pre-existing technology is apt or inappropriate,
and whether technical functions are substantively equivalent or
significantly different in nature or scope. Turning to Tussey’s second
rule, that judges should focus on core copyright concepts rather
than technical particularities, the core concepts of copyright law are
famously fluid, subjective and malleable, with the result that they are
often more useful to rationalize a conclusion than they are helpful
in producing one. The concept of “substantial reproduction” at issue
in Robertson, for example, provides little guidance in determining
how much copying is too much in any particular case (as do the
attendant concepts of “recognizability” and “essential or vital part”),
and caused apparent confusion when applied to determine the scope
of the owner’s right in a compilation.39 Finally, taking Tussey’s third
suggestion that greater regard be had to policy considerations, given
the controversy over copyright’s policy and how they ought to be
balanced, this interpretive approach will inevitably produce different
results depending on the policy perspective brought to bear by the
decision maker. It is evident, for example, that the majority’s analysis
in Robertson was guided by a concern with protecting the rights of
authors in the digital realm, while the minority was somewhat more
concerned with protecting the public interest in accessing the works
at issue.
The point I mean to make is that even a common or overlapping
understanding of technological neutrality, coupled with a shared
commitment to advancing a technologically neutral interpretation
of the law, can produce very different results when law is applied in
particular contexts. Ultimately, what matters is how decision makers
understand the law as written, the technology as used, the core
copyright concepts at play, and, most importantly, the larger legal
framework—the rights and values at stake in the copyright balance.
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3.2 Conceptions of Technological Neutrality in the Copyright
Pentalogy
The principle of technological neutrality made a decisive appearance
in three of the five judgments released by the Court in summer 2012:
Rogers, ESA and Bell. This section will provide an overview of these
cases, assessing the role played by the principle in the reasoning of the
Court. To begin, however, it is helpful to pull back and consider the
various definitions of, and rationales for, technological neutrality that
were offered in the rulings.
3.2.1 A Minimalist Approach
The narrowest formulation of the principle is found in the
dissenting judgment of Rothstein J in ESA, which adopted the
statement of LeBel and Fish JJ writing for the majority in Robertson:
“Media neutrality means that the Copyright Act should continue to
apply in different media, including more technologically advanced
ones…. Media neutrality is not a license to override the rights of
authors—it exists to protect the rights of authors and others as
technology evolves.”40 As in Robertson, this statement reflects a
restrictive vision of technological neutrality as concerned only with
non-discrimination between technological means in a formalistic
sense: the law remains applicable across different technologies. The
emphasis is, again, not on the effect of the law as such, but on its
capacity to apply in new and unanticipated contexts. To the extent that
broader public policy concerns are considered, the concern appears
to be with the continued recognition and protection of authors’ or
owners’ rights.
This restrictive version of the neutrality principle coincides with
a similarly constrained vision of its appropriate role in shaping the
interpretation of the law. Continuing in the formalist vein, Rothstein
J writes: “A media neutral application of the Act…does not imply that
a court can depart from the ordinary meaning of the words of the
Act in order to achieve the level of protection for copyright holders
that the court considers is adequate.”41 The minority is prepared to
acknowledge that “[g]enerally, a technologically neutral copyright
law is desirable.”42 Neutrality is cast here as a typical baseline, an
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appropriate default position that might be sound, but from which the
law may readily depart: regarded in this way, it is far from a standard
against which the law ought to be measured, nor even a goal to which
the lawmakers—or those tasked with applying the law—should aspire.
The minority’s depiction of the principle of technological neutrality
minimizes its potential to legitimately inform, and certainly to
determine, how the law should be interpreted and applied.
What was essentially the position of the majority in Robertson
became the minority approach to technological neutrality in ESA. By
the same token, as we will see, the majority position in ESA echoes and
builds upon the dissenting reasons in Robertson. Before we get there,
however, it is useful to consider the approach taken by the Court to
technological neutrality in its unanimous judgment in the Bell and
Rogers cases, which represent, in my view, intermediate approaches
to the principle, somewhere in between that of the minority and
majority in ESA.
3.2.2 An Intermediate Approach
In Bell, Abella J references technological neutrality as a “goal,”
and explains that the principle “seeks to have the Copyright Act
applied in a way that operates consistently, regardless of the form of
media involved, or its technological sophistication.”43 Interestingly,
the majority ruling in Robertson is cited in support of this statement.
When we consider Koops’s shades of meaning, however, we can see
a subtle but potentially important difference between the definition
offered here by Abella J, and that of Fish and LeBel JJ in Robertson.
Whereas the Robertson majority wrote that “[m]edia neutrality
means that the Copyright Act should continue to apply in different
media,”44 Abella J emphasizes that it should be applied “in a way that
operates consistently.” The emphasis is not on non-discrimination
between technologies in a formal sense (B1), but rather on substantive
equivalence of effect when the law is applied across different
technologies. Put another way, the formulation offered by Abella J
and accepted by the full bench in Bell hints at a more functional and
effects-oriented vision of technological neutrality (A1).
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In Rogers, in reasons written by Rothstein J, the discussion of
technological neutrality is largely tied, as one might anticipate, to the
idea of the law’s “continued relevance in an evolving technological
environment,”45 and the extension of the Act, “where possible,” to
technologies that “were not or could not have been contemplated at
the time of its drafting.”46 What is interesting here, however, is the
link drawn between the concept of media neutrality and the idea of
copyright as a balance between the public interest and authors’ just
rewards.47 Rothstein J draws the connection when he notes that the
copyright balance “is not appropriately struck where the existence of
copyright protection depends merely on the business model” chosen;
whether conveying content through traditional or new media, he
notes, “the end result is the same.”48 Thus we have, in Rogers, a vision
of technological neutrality articulated by Rothstein J and endorsed
by seven members of the bench49 that captures the more substantive
concern with the equivalent effect of technology in light of the
law’s purpose. That said, the emphasis remains on the protection of
copyright (and so of copyright owners) across technologies, where
consistent with the clear wording of the Act.50
3.2.3 An Expansive Approach
We can envisage the principle of technological neutrality along a
conceptual spectrum: at one end, it is a limited principle of formal nondiscrimination between technologies; at the other end, it is a broad
and substantive principle that informs a teleological interpretation of
the law. With each articulation of the principle so far, we have inched
further along the spectrum. It is with the majority’s judgment in the
ESA case, I suggest, that we reach the most expansive version of the
principle.
Abella and Moldaver JJ begin with a simple but substantive
expression of technological neutrality as requiring “that the Copyright
Act apply equally between traditional and more technologically
advanced forms of the same media.”51 Again, the emphasis is on
functional equivalence and consistency in effect. The majority stresses
that, when works are downloaded, the Internet is a delivery system—a
“technological taxi”52—no different in function or effect from a store
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clerk or a courier putting a copy of the work in the hands of the end
user. A purposive approach to technological neutrality emphasizing
function and effect (A1) therefore requires that equivalent delivery
methods receive equal treatment by the law (consistent with the idea,
in the sense of A2, that what holds offline should also hold online).
What sets the majority’s ruling apart, however, is the explicit
connection drawn between this functional approach and copyright’s
policy balance, with the statement that “[t]he traditional balance
between authors and users should be preserved in the digital
environment.”53 This resonates with Professor Tussey’s assertion that
where copyright has struck an appropriate balance in traditional
media, “similar treatment of functional equivalents should maintain
that balance.”54 It also embraces what has been called the principle
of “prescriptive parallelism,” which conveys the notion that “the
traditional copyright balance of rights and exceptions should be
preserved in the digital environment.”55 In particular, Abella and
Moldaver JJ emphasize that their application of the technological
neutrality principle is consistent with the recognition, in Théberge,
of the “limited nature” of creators’ rights and the inefficiency
of “overcompensating creators.” Commitment to technological
neutrality in effect is thus presented as a principled means by which
to maintain the appropriate balance between owners and users in
the digital environment; it follows that attributing insufficient weight
to technological neutrality can tip the balance too far in favour of
owners’ rights, to the detriment of the public interest. With this,
the majority in ESA invokes an expansive version of technological
neutrality as an overarching policy consideration that should inform
the interpretation and application of copyright law in continuing
pursuit of its broader public policy goals.
3.3 Putting Technological Neutrality to Work in the Copyright
Pentalogy
My final aim in Part 3 is to demonstrate how the varying conceptions
of technological neutrality and its role informed the interpretation and
application of the legal provisions at issue. The principle was invoked
to achieve three somewhat distinct ends: to extend the protection of
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owners’ rights into new technological contexts; to ensure the equal
availability of users’ rights in new technological contexts; and to restrict
the extension of owners’ rights into new technological contexts. As
illustrated below, these results roughly map onto the somewhat
distinct approaches to technological neutrality identified in Part
3.2 above: the minimal approach, stressing non-discrimination; the
functional approach, stressing equivalent effect; and the teleological
approach, stressing the broader copyright balance.
Figure 1. Approaches to technological neutrality.

Restrictive:
• Means-oriented;
• Formal nondiscrimination
between
technologies;
• The law continues
to apply in
different media;
• Subject to statute.

Extending
Owners’ Rights:
• Robertson (Majority)
[restrictive];
• ESA (Minority)
[restrictive];
• Rogers [intermediate].

Intermediate:
• Effects-oriented;
• Non-discrimination
between functionally
equivalent
technologies;
• The law operates
consistently across
different media;
• Where consistent with
statutory language.
.

Extending
Users’ Rights:
• Bell [intermediate].

Expansive:
• Purpose-oriented;
• Substantive non-discrimination
between functional equivalents;
• The law preserves the appropriate
balance of rights and interests in
the digital realm;
• Guided by teleological
interpretation of statute within
principled framework.

Limiting
Owners’ Rights:
• ESA (Majority)
[expansive];
• Robertson (Minority)
[expansive]
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3.3.1 Extending Owners’ Rights
Both Rogers and ESA were concerned with the scope and
application of the section 3(1)(f) right of the copyright owner to
“communicate the work by telecommunication.” In Rogers, the
question was whether music streamed over the Internet to individual
end users is a communication “to the public” within the meaning of
section 3(1)(f). ESA was concerned with whether downloading video
games that include musical works is a “communication” at all. In both
cases, technological neutrality was raised as a basis for extending the
protection of owners’ rights into the online environment.
The communication right has been described as “one of the most
clearly technology indifferent legal provisions” in the ICT field.56 In
Canada, as Rothstein J explains, the previous “technology-specific
communication right” that attached to “radiocommunication” was
amended in 1988 to the “neutral language [of ‘telecommunication’] to
encompass evolving but then unknown technological advances.”57 Yet,
what we see in these cases is that, given the significant difference in
the nature of offline and online communication methods, technologyindifferent laws do not necessarily render extraneous a technologyneutralizing interpretation.58 As Shira Perlmutter has observed:
[E]ven rights deliberately written to be technologically
neutral are quickly called into question by the rapidity
of today’s technological developments. There enures a
tremendous diversion of time and energy in debating
the precise borders of each right. Which rights are
implicated by a particular type of dissemination—for
example, “making available” online? Reproduction?
Distribution? Rental? Communication?59
Rothstein J and the minority in ESA were of the view that the
communication right is implicated when works are downloaded over
the Internet.60 A means-oriented and formal non-discrimination
approach to technological neutrality might suggest that discriminating
between transmissions of electronic downloads and streamed
transmissions is contrary to the basic principle. However, seen from
a more substantive and effects-oriented perspective, the minority’s
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reasoning can be admonished for falling afoul of Tussey’s second
rule of thumb—focusing on the technical details of the technologies
at issue. By directing the inquiry toward the system specifics (the
technical means of transmission) rather than the outcome of that
technical process (the acquisition of a copy), the minority could be
accused of pinning its judgment on “technological details rather
than lasting principles governing rights and liabilities.”61 More
importantly, satisfied with the “ordinary” meaning of the neutral term
“communication” and its application to downloads by virtue of their
“transmission,”62 the minority also falls afoul of Tussey’s third rule:
its focus is on the black letter law, largely unencumbered, it would
seem, by a concern with the effect of capturing downloads within the
communication right—the substantive inequality produced between
traditional and online distribution systems, and the resultant impact
on copyright’s fragile balance. Attentive primarily to the need to secure
protection for owners across new technologies, the minority’s reasons
relegate consideration of the broader role of technological neutrality
in securing consistency in effect and preserving the appropriate
policy balance.
In Rogers, communication “to the public” was held to include
“a series of point-to-point communications of the same work to an
aggregation of individuals” on the grounds that “it matters little for the
purposes of copyright protection whether the members of the public
receive the communication in the same or in different places, at the
same or at different times or at their own or the sender’s initiative.”63 The
Court emphasized the technology-neutral language of the amended
statutory provision64 and found, in the expanded scope of section
3(1)(f), “evidence that the Act has evolved to ensure its continued
relevance in an evolving technological environment.” Thus, the
Court determined that limiting the communication rights to “pushtechnologies” and so excluding “pull-technologies” would be
“inconsistent with the neutral language of the Act itself.”65 The extension
of neutral statutory language to afford protection in relation to online
streaming is a good example of a non-discrimination approach at
work, ensuring that the law does not discriminate between traditional
broadcast and Internet communications, the effects of which are viewed
as essentially equivalent. The approach is also in line with Tussey’s second
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recommendation: that courts avoid technology-centred judgments
and interpret copyright’s core concepts in terms applicable across
technologies.66 Taking this non-discrimination approach, technological
neutrality was employed to extend owners’ right to “communicate to
the public” into a new technological context where communications
occur at a place and time chosen individually by end users.
3.3.2 Extending Users’ Rights
As Cameron Hutchinson has observed, the most significant
aspect of the Bell case in regard to technological neutrality is the
explicit extension, for the first time, of the principle beyond the rights
of copyright owners to the rights of users.67 The issue before the Court
was whether the streaming of short extracts or “previews” of musical
works could benefit from the fair dealing defence. SOCAN argued
that the “amount” of the dealing was unfair in light of the aggregate
quantity of music heard through previews by consumers. Invoking the
principle of technological neutrality, the Court held that the relevant
amount is rather the proportion of each extract to the whole work
(thus supporting the finding of fair dealing for research purposes).
The Court explained:
[G]iven the ease and magnitude with which digital
works are disseminated over the Internet, focusing on
the “aggregate” amount of the dealing in cases involving
digital works could well lead to disproportionate
findings of unfairness when compared with nondigital works. If…large-scale organized dealings are
inherently unfair, most of what online service providers
do with musical works would be treated as copyright
infringement. This…potentially undermines the goal of
technological neutrality….68
The “intermediate version” of technological neutrality articulated
in Bell, which was focused on consistent operation of the law across
technologies, allowed the principle to expand from preserving
owners’ rights in new environments to preserving the rights of users
to deal fairly. While online dealings may well be different in scale
than their offline equivalents (and the “character” of such dealing
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may weigh against finding fairness), the Court was alert to the risk
that assuming (or even double-counting) unfairness based on the
potential scale or aggregate volume of digital dealings could effectively
render the fair dealing defence severely weakened or even eviscerated
in the online environment. Such a result would be contrary to the
more substantive vision of technological neutrality as concerned
with achieving consistency in the effect of the law when applied
in different technological contexts. As the Court recognized, the
effects of copyright law depend not only on the continued protection
of owners’ rights, but also on the continued recognition of their
appropriate limits.
3.3.3 Restricting the Reach of Owners’ Rights
It should come as no surprise, however, that it is with the ESA case,
where the majority offered the most expansive version of technological
neutrality as a guiding principle, that we see its most prominent and
potentially impactful use. Finding that digital downloads implicated
only the reproduction right and not the communication right,
which has historically been linked to public performance, Abella
and Moldaver JJ focused on “what the internet technology was
functionally doing as opposed to how it was technically doing it.”69
The majority thus explained: “Although a download and a stream are
both ‘transmissions’ in technical terms (they both use ‘data packet
technology’), they are not both ‘communications’ for the purposes of
the Copyright Act…. Unlike a download, the experience of a stream is
much more akin to a broadcast or performance.”70
The importance of differentiating downloading from streaming
activities—while justified through an analysis of legislative history71
and a (somewhat controversial) interpretation of section 3(1)72—
was clearly motivated by an overarching concern with the practical
consequences of finding otherwise. If, as SOCAN argued, the activity
of downloading a copy of a video game can infringe on both the
reproduction and the communication right, the effect is to permit
“double-dipping” by copyright owners,73 requiring the payment of two
fees to two separate collective societies.74 This result was dismissed as
inefficient, and therefore harmful to “both end users and copyright
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owners.”75 Moreover, it was explicitly criticized for “ignor[ing]
the principle of technological neutrality.”76 The majority reasoned
that permitting such double dipping in respect of copies delivered
through the Internet would “effectively impose a gratuitous cost for
the use of more efficient, Internet-based technologies,” as compared
with delivery through stores or by mail. Informed by its version of
technological neutrality, then, the majority opted quite deliberately to
interpret the Act “in a way that avoids imposing an additional layer
of protections and fees based solely on the method of delivery of the
work to the end user.”77
This use of the principle is interesting in two respects. First,
as noted, the result is to discriminate between two kinds of online
activities—streaming and downloading—and, in doing so, to overlook
the technical means employed for both kinds of transmissions (data
packet transmission that is not a “single activity” in any technical
sense). This approach might be thought to undermine technological
neutrality insofar as it distinguishes between technical processes and
imposes legal consequences for using one form of transmission over
another. Such a critique would have to rely, however, on a formal nondiscrimination–based vision of the principle. Thus, Rothstein J and
the minority warn against “limit[ing] the scope of the communication
right when it is applied to one such new technology.”78 However,
taking a substantive approach concerned with functional equivalence
and discriminatory effect, I would suggest, the majority’s conclusion
is well supported and eminently defensible. Protecting an additional
income stream for digital downloads that is not available for hard
copy sales is essentially the opposite of technological neutrality, thus
understood.79
Second, the majority’s ruling and reasons signal a willingness
to actively limit the potential reach of the ostensibly technologyneutral rights of copyright owners in new technological contexts
in recognition of the broader policy balance implicated by owners’
claims. In this vein, the minority takes a legally formalist stance and
criticizes the majority for “reading into the Act restrictions which are
not apparent from and are even inconsistent with the current language
of the Act.”80 According to Rothstein J, by “inferring limits into the
communication right,” the majority ruling went “beyond the function
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of the courts.”81 Indeed, the ruling has proved controversial precisely
because the Court could easily have accorded “communication by
telecommunication” its readily available and previously attributed
meaning,82 and thereby protected the rights of owners to demand
public performance fees for every digital transmission of their works.
Instead, as Professor Hutchinson explains, the majority
presented technological neutrality as a “principle of non-interference”
when it sought to “avoid imposing copyright liability on technologies
and activities that, while theoretically capable of being included under
the Act, only incidentally implicate copyright.”83 In doing so, the Court
took a more activist stance, unapologetically curtailing owners’ rights
in the digital environment in the name of technological neutrality,
thereby insulating the users of new technologies from potential
(and doctrinally justifiable) liability—an interpretive approach
with potentially significant consequences for future demands for
online copyright protection.84 While the expansive version of the
technological neutrality principle might equally support extending
copyright or protecting user rights in particular contexts, it is only in
this expansive form that the principle has thus far been employed to
actively delimit owner rights.
4. The Promise of the Technological Neutrality Principle

Having charted the various definitions and rationales offered in
respect of the principle of technological neutrality, and their bearing
on the interpretation and application of the law, I want to offer, in the
final section, some brief thoughts about the justification and potential
implications of the principle as it emerged, fully formed, from the
ESA case.
4.1 On Justifications
To the extent that technological neutrality can be derived directly
from the face of the Copyright Act, it is generally found in the wording
of section 3(1) and the owner’s exclusive right to reproduce the work
“in any material form whatsoever.” This provision undoubtedly
demonstrates an ambition toward a technologically neutral copyright
but, in itself, it demands nothing more than extending the reach of
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owners’ rights to new media, thereby ensuring non-discrimination
in the applicability of the law to different technologies, and, to a
certain degree, “future-proofing” the law. What we see in ESA is a
markedly broader, functional vision of technological neutrality as a
guiding principle that actively distinguishes between technological
means and restricts copyright’s reach in new contexts with a view to
achieving consistency in effect; so, if not in the language of the Act,
where can the principle, in this form, find its origin and justification?
The answer, I suggest, is simple and lies in the overarching policy
goals of the copyright system as articulated by the Supreme Court in
the Théberge case.
In Théberge, writing for the majority, Binnie J stated that
copyright requires “a balance between promoting the public interest
in the encouragement and dissemination of works of the arts and
intellect and obtaining a just reward for the creator.”85 In Bell, Abella J
explained the significance of the case:
Théberge reflected a move away from an earlier, authorcentric view which focused on the exclusive right of
authors and copyright owners to control how their
works were used in the marketplace…. Théberge focused
attention instead on the importance copyright plays in
promoting the public interest, and emphasized that the
dissemination of artistic works is central to developing a
robustly cultured and intellectual public domain. …
[B]oth protection and access must be sensitively
balanced in order to achieve this goal.86
This principled recognition of copyright as requiring a sensitive
public policy balance, rather than simply the protection of a
private property right, has had a marked impact on the landscape
of Canadian copyright law. If copyright in general requires this
balance, then it must surely follow that copyright in the digital era
requires the preservation of this balance, which must mean that the
law should have the same effect (produce a similar balance of rights
and interests) whether applied offline or online. The broad principle
of technological neutrality, as employed by the majority in ESA,
therefore flows naturally from the Court’s recognition of the Théberge
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balance and its continued significance in the digital environment.
Correspondingly, as one might expect, the most limited version
of technological neutrality, as employed by the minority in ESA,
aligns with a restrictive vision of balance and its role in guiding the
interpretation of the law. Citing the same statement of balance from
Théberge, Rothstein J continues: “While the ‘courts should strive
to maintain an appropriate balance between these two goals,’…[i]n
Canada, copyright [remains] a creature of statute.”87 Neither balance
nor technological neutrality, from this viewpoint, offers a basis
for “delimit[ing] the scope of broadly defined rights in the digital
environment”; rather, this task is properly left to Parliament, which
will “legislate when it considers copyright protection to be improperly
balanced.”88
With respect, Rothstein J appears to permit the principle of
balance to inform the extension of owners’ rights into the online
environment (protecting owners in Rogers), but not to limit owners’
rights (in Robertson and ESA). My argument is that, if one begins with
a commitment to the principle of balance as articulated in Théberge,
then it should follow as a matter of course that the balance must be
preserved as technologies evolve; this, in turn, demands a principle
of technological neutrality that focuses on the effects on the law in
new technological contexts, and that justifies (in Koops’s terms) a
functionalist or teleological interpretation of the law with a view to
the substantive principles at stake.89 In Tussey’s terms, technological
neutrality is necessarily furthered by consideration of copyright’s
broader policy goals, rather strict adherence to the black letter law.90
The important point is that technological neutrality, as presented by
the majority in ESA, is not a new and overarching policy parachuted
into Canadian copyright law; rather, it is a principled interpretive tool
mandated by the overarching policy of Canada’s copyright law—the
preservation or continuing pursuit of an appropriate balance between
protecting authors and promoting the public interest. As Tomas
Lipinski writes, “The overall goal of balance in the copyright law
between rights of copyright owners and copyright users is paramount
and the concept of technological neutrality in the application of the
law assists in achieving that goal.”91
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4.2 On Implications
If there is anything on which everyone can agree, it would seem to
be that the Court’s invocation of technological neutrality in ESA is
of potentially enormous significance when it comes to interpreting
and applying the Copyright Act as amended by the Copyright
Modernization Act. Exactly what significance the principle will have,
however, and what outcomes it might produce, are less evident and
more open to debate. As Michael Geist has argued, “the linkage
between technological neutrality and the limited nature of creators’
rights could prove very significant as the court is concerned that a
non-neutral approach may result in overcompensating creators.”92
With this as a potential starting point, the general assumption seems
to be that, for better or for worse, the principle may be employed
to restrict the scope of the owner rights that have been created or
expanded by the new Act.
The new Act contains a large volume of technologically specific
provisions that would appear to be inherently at odds with the guiding
principle of technological neutrality as a regulatory strategy. It should
be recalled, however, that as a principle of regulation, technology
specificity is the opposite of technology independence; technologyspecific regulations may thus be said to be technologically neutral if
it is claimed that they differentiate between technologies with legally
relevant differences. In such instances, different treatment may be
“necessary to realize an equivalent result.”93 Thus, the additional
protection of digital rights management (DRM) systems, for example,
is identified by Koops as “a technology-specific or technology-driven
regulation, which aims to create the same copyright-law effect in
the on-line era as it had in the off-line era.”94 Such protection may
therefore be claimed to be functional (in the sense of Koops’s A1), by
attempting to reinstate the norms of the analog world in the digital
environment through a combination of technology and law. Koops
explains:
[T]he advent of new technologies has threatened to shift
the power balance between copyright owners and users
to make users more powerful: they can cheaply and
without limit make perfect copies, which formerly they
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could not do. Thus, the law reacts by shifting the power
balance back towards copyright holders: it prohibits the
circumvention of DRM systems.95
But as Koops rightly warns, “[w]hether it achieves that aim is
another matter; the power balance is now arguably tipped deeper
towards copyright holders than it has ever done before.”96 Indeed,
even the premise that new technologies represent a net threat to
copyright owners (never mind the appropriate legal response) is
open to dispute. As Lipinski notes, “those who have control of a
technologically dependent medium, the digital medium for example,
in fact control both the ownership and the access to the work, without
heed to users’ rights.” Rather than neutrality, then, Lipinski perceives
in digital environments “the ascendancy of ownership rights.”97
It might be claimed that the technology-specific provisions of the
Copyright Modernization Act are aimed at ensuring the continuing
application and enforcement of copyright in the digital environment,
with the intention that “what holds offline should also hold online.”
Certainly, it seems fair to say that copyright’s balance “can no longer
be purely internal to the legal framework of rights and limitations
but must factor in elements of practical reality, including the impact
of the additional risks engendered, and the additional protection
made possible by technology.”98 Even rationalized in these terms,
however, many of the technology-specific provisions exemplify
the distortive potential of such efforts, especially when guided by a
primary concern to protect the rights of copyright owners against the
increased risk associated with the digital environment. By focusing
on the perceived threat to copyright owners presented by digital
technologies, Canada’s legislature has enacted technology-specific
laws that overcompensate owners and tip the balance in their favour.
In particular, the additional protections afforded to digital locks (the
technological protection measures that prevent access or certain uses
of digital content) seem largely incapable of justification when seen
through the lens of technological neutrality.
On their face, of course, the provisions violate the basic
starting point of technological neutrality insofar as they target the
technology itself: section 41.1(1)(c), for example, makes it unlawful to
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“manufacture, import, distribute, offer for sale or rental or provide…
any technology, device or component” produced primarily for the
purpose of circumventing a technological protection measure. Such
device prohibitions regulate particular technologies (the means)
rather than particular uses (the effects), discriminate between
different technologies, and quite deliberately restrict the development
of certain technologies. There is no sound basis on which to assert
that the anti-circumvention provisions simply shift the balance back.
The greatest difficulty with such an argument is that these added
protections entirely neglect one half of the copyright balance by
failing to safeguard in any meaningful way the rights of lawful users
of protected works. The new Act contains no general fair dealing
defence to circumvention liability, and no route by which to demand
access to works for lawful purposes. By privileging digital locks and
their protection over user rights and the public interest, the new rules
disrupt the traditional copyright balance, “sacrificing user rights and
privileges to the ultimate power of technical control.”99
As such, Michael Geist is right to suggest that “the biggest long
term impact [of the ESA decision] may be felt when courts begin to
assess the effect of the new digital lock rules. Those rules are distinctly
non-neutral and could face a rough ride if challenged before the
courts.”100 Geist explains, “those rules ‘impose an additional layer of
protections’ and create ‘a gratuitous cost’ for consumers who lose their
user rights in the shift to Internet-based technologies”—precisely the
kinds of effects that the Court found to be contrary to its substantive
version of the technological neutrality principle.101
I argued above that technological neutrality is not a new principle
suddenly imported by the Court into Canada’s copyright law; rather,
technological neutrality is about preserving copyright’s fundamental
balance between owners and the public as technologies evolve. By the
same token, the digital lock protections in the Copyright Modernization
Act do not violate the principle of technological neutrality simply
because they are technology specific; rather, these additions to the
rights of owners violate the principle because they fail to preserve the
copyright balance in the digital environment.
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With the enactment of the Copyright Modernization Act, the
legislature has opted for an abundance of technology-specific
provisions that establish additional protections for owners without
corresponding protections for users. The new requirements lack
transparency and comprehensibility for ordinary Canadians tasked
with following the rules, and place extraordinary monitoring and
compliance obligations on intermediaries and service providers (even
including, for example, teachers offering distance-learning lessons).
There is no doubt that, in doing so, the legislature has threatened
the ability of the judiciary to keep copyright on the technologically
neutral and balanced trajectory established by the Supreme Court
in recent copyright jurisprudence. However, this does not minimize
the significance of these path-breaking decisions—it suggests that
the Court’s powerful reasoning may have come just in time to save
Canada’s copyright balance.
Koops writes that “within a system of functional interpretation
of laws, technology neutrality becomes a minor issue: practice can
deal with laws that seem technology-specific by interpreting them in
a functional way.”102 While not always possible or sufficient to achieve
equivalence of result, “the possibility of functional interpretation may
often be a good way of circumventing the problem of technology
neutrality.”103 Moreover, as Koops suggests, the effects of technologyspecific regulation can be minimized by the establishment of a clear
framework of substantive principles such as that elucidated by the
Supreme Court in the copyright arena over the past decade. By
providing a clear sense of the “fundamental rights and values that are
at stake and the rationale that underlies” Canada’s copyright system,
the Court has established a principled framework that will, in the
future, facilitate “the practice of interpreting…technology-specific
laws…in a functional, teleological way.”104
It is hoped, then, that as Canadian courts grapple with the
amended Copyright Act, and find themselves challenged with
interpreting its dense, technology-specific provisions in new and likely
unforeseen situations, this principled framework of rights and values
will guide the judicial understanding and application of the law. As
an interpretive tool, the principle of technological neutrality should
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assist in achieving consistency in the application of copyright (and its
limits) in furtherance of copyright’s purposes. This should mean, for
example, minimizing to the extent possible the scope and impact of
the anti-circumvention right on non-infringing uses, thereby giving
substance to the Court’s repeated insistence that fair dealing is a
“users’ right” and “an essential part of furthering the public interest
objectives of the Copyright Act.”105 Without abandoning due regard for
the statutory language,106 courts should strive to apply the text of the
law in a way that advances the purposes of copyright by preserving
the balance between authors’ rights and the public interest in the
encouragement and dissemination of works. It is unfortunate that
elements of the newly written law do more to jeopardize than to assist
in this task; but it is fortunate indeed that those tasked with applying
the law can do so with the principle of technological neutrality to
guide them as they carve out a path for copyright in this digital age.
5. Conclusion

The idea that technological neutrality should be a governing principle
in the realm of copyright law has long been present in Canada, as
elsewhere, but has gone largely unexamined until now. The Supreme
Court’s 2012 copyright decisions shone a light on the principle and its
potential significance in shaping the copyright law of the digital era.
Evident in these rulings were three distinguishable conceptualizations
of technological neutrality: a minimalist version focused on formal
non-discrimination and the extension of rights into new media; an
intermediate version concerned with functional equivalence and
consistency of effect in the application of copyright to new media;
and an expansive version—extending beyond any previous judicial
treatment of the principle in Canada or elsewhere—that demands a
teleological interpretation of the law aimed at advancing the purposes
of the copyright system as the technological landscape shifts. With
these decisions, technological neutrality emerged as a fundamental
and functional principle that can inform the application of copyright
law in important and arguably unanticipated ways. Not only can it
explain the extension of copyright protection into new technological
contexts, but it can also be asserted as a safeguard of user rights
and their availability in respect of novel technologically facilitated
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consumer practices. Most importantly, however, the principle
supports circumscribing the potential reach of existing owners’ rights
where their extension threatens to upset copyright’s fragile balance in
the digital domain.
The unprecedented power of technological neutrality to shape
the contours of copyright protection therefore depends on an
understanding of the principle that extends beyond simple nondiscrimination in the application of copyright norms to new media.
Rather, its power flows from a substantive commitment to the
notion that copyright law should apply with equivalent purpose and
effect across the technological landscape. Taking seriously the idea
of copyright as a balance between authors and the public reveals
the principle to be ultimately concerned with the preservation of
this copyright balance in the digital environment. As such, the
technological neutrality principle does not occupy a separate or
parallel position alongside the guiding principle of balance—it is
part and parcel of that balance. Its significance, then, will not be
determined by the mere acceptance of technological neutrality as
an ideal. As evidenced by the various iterations and applications of
the principle by the Justices of the Supreme Court, the significance
of technological neutrality will ultimately depend on the meaning
and significance that we accord to the public policy objectives of our
copyright system.
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